LND

lnwallet/rpcwallet: accept zero-value WitnessUtxo entries in remote-sign prep

Before forwarding a SignOutputRaw request to the remote signer instance,
remoteSign rebuilds a PSBT from the unsigned transaction and annotates
every input with a WitnessUtxo (so the downstream walletkit.SignPsbt
call accepts it — taproot sighash computation requires the prev output
of every input, not just the one being signed).

For non-signed inputs the prep stage first asks the watch-only wallet
about the outpoint via FetchOutpointInfo, then — when the wallet does
not own or track the outpoint — falls back to the sign descriptor's
PrevOutputFetcher. The fallback previously required `utxo.Value != 0`,
which silently dropped legitimate zero-value entries on the floor and
left the corresponding PSBT input bare.

The walletkit.SignPsbt entry point on the remote signer then rejected
the PSBT with "input (index=N) doesn't specify any UTXO info" because
input N had neither a WitnessUtxo nor a NonWitnessUtxo annotation.

BIP-322 (signing virtual transactions for message attestation) is the
canonical hitter: its to_spend output is mandated by the BIP to be
exactly value=0 with the message commitment as pk_script, and that
output is referenced as input 0 of every BIP-322 to_sign transaction.
Any caller that drives a BIP-322 sign through a remote-signer LND
deployment was failing for this reason.

The validation we actually want is that the fetched prev output is
representable as a usable WitnessUtxo: non-nil and with a non-empty
pk_script. Drop the Value check; the zero-value case is well-formed
and the resulting PSBT input will serialize cleanly. The fetched-but-
empty-pk_script case continues to be rejected (a WitnessUtxo with
empty PkScript is malformed at PSBT serialization), and the warning
log when no fallback resolves the outpoint is preserved verbatim.

Lift the WitnessUtxo-population loop out of remoteSign into a
package-level helper so the resolution policy is unit-testable without
spinning up a real wallet + remote signer pair. The helper takes a
fetchOutpointInfoFn callback that mirrors
lnwallet.WalletController.FetchOutpointInfo. No behavior change for
the wallet-owns-it path or the no-fallback path.

routerrpc: remove deprecated SendPayment, SendToRoute, TrackPayment impls

Remove the SendPayment, SendToRoute, and TrackPayment shim methods from
router_server_deprecated.go that delegated to their V2 counterparts.
Remove their macaroon permission entries from router_server.go and the
now-unused legacyTrackPaymentServer wrapper.

lnrpc: remove deprecated Send* RPC server implementations

Remove handler implementations and macaroon permission entries for the
now-deleted lnrpc RPCs: SendPayment, SendPaymentSync, SendToRoute, and
SendToRouteSync.

Also remove the dead payment infrastructure that was exclusively used by
these handlers: paymentStream, rpcPaymentRequest, rpcPaymentIntent,
extractPaymentIntent, dispatchPaymentIntent, sendPayment, and
sendPaymentSync.

docs: add v0.21.0 RC testing guides for humans and agents

Adds docs/testing-guides/v0.21.0/ with a per-feature guide for the
v0.21.0-beta.rc1 release. Each guide follows a fixed template
(prereqs, setup, scenarios with concrete pass/fail signals, failure
investigation) so RC testers and automated agents can work through
them predictably.

Coverage:
- Headline features: production taproot channels, RBF taproot
coop-close, payment store KV->SQL migration, onion messaging +
rate limiting.
- High-risk regressions / breaking changes: closed-channel
tombstone (sqlite/postgres downgrade trap), reorg-safe channel
closes + MinCLTVDelta raise, chain_params network-mismatch DB
guard, GetDebugInfo log opt-in.
- New RPCs / operator features: payment-adjacent RPCs bundle,
multiple read-only middleware interceptors.

This is a first draft intended for community review on the PR.
payment-sql-migration.md carries a TBD callout for the
SkipNativeSQLMigration rescue-path behavior, pending developer
confirmation.

lntest: pin pre-v30 mempool policy defaults in itest bitcoind

Bitcoind v30 lowered the default minrelaytxfee and incrementalrelayfee
from 1000 sat/kvB (1 sat/vB) to 100 sat/kvB. The itest suite was
written against the old defaults and the lower values cascade into:

- integer sat/vByte assertions losing precision below 1 sat/vB, and
- RBF bump thresholds that alter sweeper/bumpfee replacement timing.

Pin the old defaults in the itest bitcoind backend so the existing
tests keep passing without per-test adaptation. Running against the
new defaults is still worth doing, but that is a separate exercise
that should not be bundled with the v30 version bump.

peer: gate onion message ingress on having an open channel

Onion message forwarding is an unpaid side channel. Without any peer
qualification the byte-bucket limiters added in the previous commits are
our only defense against a Sybil attacker: an attacker that can cheaply
spin up N identities and burn a full per-peer byte budget on each one
saturates the global bucket and converts the aggregate cap into a
service-denial primitive against legitimate channel peers. This was
raised on PR review — the per-peer cap is good, but the global cap on
its own is a Sybil multiplier if peer identity is free. The proper fix
is to make new identities cost real capital, which is what requiring a
funded channel does.

This commit adds a channel-presence gate as the first check in
allowOnionMessage, ahead of both the per-peer and the global rate
limiters. Messages from peers that do not have at least one fully
open channel with us are dropped with a new dropReasonNoChannel
sentinel and never allocate any rate limiter state — the gate runs
before either limiter is consulted, so no-channel peers cannot burn
tokens on any bucket. Pending channels are deliberately excluded from
the check: they are represented as nil values in the activeChannels
map, are cheap to open and prone to getting stuck, and so do not
provide the capital-cost guarantee the Sybil defense depends on.
Existing Brontide cleanup paths (StopOnionActorIfExists,
OnionPeerLimiter.Forget) already handle teardown on peer disconnect;
nothing new is needed there because the gate keeps no-channel peers
from ever allocating per-peer state in the first place.

For the hot path we cannot afford to iterate the activeChannels
registry on every incoming onion message, so Brontide now carries a
numActiveChans atomic.Int32 that shadows the count of non-pending
entries in activeChannels. hasActiveChannels is a single atomic Load
and is therefore O(1). The counter is maintained in lockstep with
activeChannels at every mutation site: loadActiveChannels increments
it as it populates the registry during Start(); addActiveChannel uses
a new lnutils.SyncMap.Swap method (a thin typed wrapper around
sync.Map.Swap) to atomically replace any prior entry so that both
brand-new channels and pending-to-active promotions bump the counter
by exactly one; WipeChannel and handleRemovePendingChannel both use
LoadAndDelete so they can inspect the prior value and only decrement
when the removed entry was non-nil. Under race, this keeps the
counter and the map consistent even when RPC WipeChannel races with
the channelManager goroutine.

The accompanying unit tests cover: the no-channel drop path at the
allowOnionMessage level, asserting that neither the global stub
counter nor the per-peer limiter's dropped counter move when the
gate fires; the subsequent channel-gained path on the same peer,
asserting the same message is accepted once hasChannel flips; and a
focused Brontide-level test that walks the counter through initial
emptiness, a pending-only state (counter must stay at zero), a
pending-to-active promotion via direct Store + Add, the pending
delete path through handleRemovePendingChannel (must not underflow),
and the active delete path through LoadAndDelete + Add(-1) that
WipeChannel uses internally. Running with -race confirms the
Swap/LoadAndDelete patterns keep the counter and the map in sync
under concurrent access.

onionmessage: add token-bucket rate limiter primitives

The existing per-peer actor mailbox (capacity 50, RED from depth 40) only
bounds in-flight queue depth. It does not cap throughput: a peer that
drains its actor quickly can saturate our Sphinx unwrap CPU, replay-DB
writes, and outbound forwarding bandwidth without ever tripping RED. At
spec-max onion message sizes (~32 KiB per sphinx packet) a single
well-behaved-draining peer is enough to push multiple Mbps of unpaid
forwarded traffic through us, and aggregate fan-in from many peers
multiplies that into tens of Mbps — an amount of bandwidth that is very
much out of proportion for a side channel on a payment routing node.

This commit adds the building blocks for two token-bucket limiters that
will be wired into the onion message ingress path in a follow-up commit:
a process-wide global limiter and a per-peer registry. Both drop (rather
than wait) on over-limit so that a hostile peer cannot grow our
goroutine or memory footprint simply by sustaining above-threshold
traffic. The per-peer registry keys buckets on the peer's compressed
pubkey, creates them lazily, and retains them for the lifetime of the
process so a peer cannot reset its burst by cycling the connection;
cardinality is bounded by the live channel-peer count (the ingress call
site gates on having a channel before allocating per-peer state), so no
time-based GC is needed.

A minimal RateLimiter interface is introduced so that callers and tests
can substitute noop or alternate implementations without reaching into
x/time/rate directly, and a small countingLimiter wrapper keeps an
atomic drop counter plus a one-shot first-drop flag for observability.
A rate of zero (or a non-positive burst) yields a noop limiter,
providing a clean "disabled" mode without branching at the call site.

On top of those, a single IngressLimiter interface composes the
per-peer and global buckets behind one surface so that callers —
notably the peer readHandler — only thread one object through Config
and call one method per incoming onion message. Drop reasons are
surfaced as sentinel errors (ErrPeerRateLimit, ErrGlobalRateLimit)
wrapped in fn.Result[fn.Unit] so callers match on them with errors.Is
rather than comparing free-form strings. The stock implementation
encodes the load-bearing ordering — per-peer first, then global —
inside AllowN so that a hostile peer whose own bucket is already empty
cannot burn global tokens on every rejected attempt and starve
legitimate peers.

Default constants targeting roughly ~5 Mbps worst-case ingress at
spec-max message sizes are added alongside the existing mailbox
defaults.

lnwallet: add MuSig2 secret nonces and partial sig replay to test vectors

In this commit, we extend the taproot test vector generator and verifier
to include MuSig2 secret nonces and a full partial signature replay
test.

For the generator, we now capture the correct nonces for each
commitment transaction: local's verification nonce (from LocalSession)
for local's own commitment, and remote's JIT signing nonce (from
RemoteSession) for the same commitment. Previously, the local nonce was
incorrectly captured from the RemoteSession, which corresponds to a
different commitment transaction.

The new musig2_partial_sig_replay test sub-suite verifies three
properties for each test case:

1. The remote partial sig can be independently reproduced from the
secret nonce and private key using musig2.Sign().

2. The local partial sig can be independently produced and verified
using the local secret nonce.

3. Both partial sigs combine (via the Session API) into the exact
Schnorr signature present in the commitment transaction witness.

This enables interop implementations to validate their MuSig2 signing
logic against the test vectors without needing to match nonce derivation
algorithms across different secp256k1 libraries.

multi: add custom nonce rand support to MuSig2 sessions

In this commit, we add the ability to inject a custom random source
for generating JIT (Just-In-Time) signing nonces in MuSig2 sessions.
By default, MuSig2 signing nonces are generated using crypto/rand,
which makes signatures non-deterministic across runs. For test vector
generation, we need fully reproducible signatures from a fixed seed.

A new `customNonceRand` field is threaded through `MusigSession`,
`MusigSessionCfg`, `MusigPairSession`, and exposed via the
`WithCustomSigningRand` channel option. When set, the custom reader
is passed to `musig2.WithCustomRand()` during JIT nonce generation
in `SignCommit`. All existing callers pass `fn.None[io.Reader]()` to
preserve the current behavior of using the system CSPRNG.

lnwallet: regenerate test vectors with BIP-340 HTLC signatures

Regenerate the test vector JSON with HTLC second-level transaction
signatures that use BIP-340 standard nonce derivation (zero auxrand)
instead of RFC6979. This makes the HTLC signatures reproducible across
different Schnorr implementations. The commitment transaction MuSig2
signatures are unchanged.

lnwallet: add secret nonce stashing to MusigSession for test vectors

In this commit, we add the ability for MusigSession to capture and
expose the raw 97-byte MuSig2 secret nonce generated during JIT signing
nonce creation. This is gated behind the customNonceRand option, so it
only activates in test vector generation mode.

The stashed secret nonce is consumed on read (cleared after access) to
prevent accidental nonce reuse. This enables interop test vectors to
include the raw secret nonces, allowing other implementations to replay
the MuSig2 signing process without needing to match the exact nonce
derivation algorithm used by btcd's musig2 library.

lnwallet: fix HTLC sig-to-transaction mapping in test vector generator

In this commit, we fix two interrelated bugs in the way HTLC signatures
are associated with their corresponding second-level transactions in the
taproot test vector generator.

The first issue was that HtlcSigs are sorted by BIP 69 output index
(matching the commitment transaction's output ordering), but the old
code was assigning signatures using the iteration order of incoming
HTLCs followed by outgoing HTLCs. This meant timeout transaction
signatures were getting paired with success transactions and vice versa
whenever the output ordering didn't happen to match the incoming-first
iteration order. This is the root cause of the invalid HTLC-timeout
signatures that eclair reported when cross-validating.

We now collect all HTLC entries (both incoming and outgoing) into a
single slice, sort them by their commitment output index, then zip them
against the HtlcSigs array so each signature lines up with the correct
second-level transaction.

The second issue was in the HTLC-success preimage extraction path. The
old code read the witness script from index [4] (the control block) and
used a hardcoded byte offset of 69 to locate the payment hash, then
wrote the preimage into index [3] (overwriting the script). The correct
taproot witness layout is [remoteSig, localSig, preimage, script,
controlBlock], so the script lives at [3] and the preimage slot is [2].
We now use `txscript.ScriptTokenizer` to walk the script opcodes and
find OP_HASH160 followed by the 20-byte push data, which is far more
robust than relying on fragile byte offsets that break if the script
template ever changes.

lnwallet: add 3rd-party signature verification for taproot test vectors

In this commit, we add a `signature_verification` sub-test to the
taproot test vector verifier that performs full script execution against
both the commitment transaction and all HTLC resolution transactions.

This uses `txscript.NewEngine` to execute the taproot witness programs
exactly as a Bitcoin node would, providing an independent check that all
signatures in the test vectors are cryptographically valid. For the
commitment transaction, we verify its witness against the funding output
pkScript. For each HTLC resolution transaction, we verify its witness
against the corresponding commitment output it spends.

This catches issues that the structural comparison tests (hex matching)
cannot: for instance, a transaction can have the correct structure but
carry an invalid signature if the sighash was computed over the wrong
prevout or if the wrong key was used for signing. Running the full
script engine also validates the control block, the tap leaf hash, and
the overall taproot spend path.

lnwallet: use BIP-340 nonce derivation for HTLC sigs in test vectors

btcd's schnorr.Sign defaults to RFC6979 nonce derivation, while
libsecp256k1 (used by eclair, CLN, etc) uses BIP-340's standard
nonce derivation with zero auxrand. Both are deterministic but produce
different signatures for the same key and message, causing HTLC
signature mismatches in interop test vectors.

This commit introduces a bip340Signer wrapper that overrides
SignOutputRaw for taproot script path spends to use
schnorr.CustomNonce([32]byte{}) — matching BIP-340 deterministic
signing behavior. The wrapper is only used in the test vector
generator; production signing paths are unchanged.

Note that MuSig2 commitment signatures were already using BIP-340
nonces internally (via the musig2.Sign path), so only the HTLC
second-level transaction signatures were affected.

lnwallet: regenerate taproot channel test vectors

Regenerate `test_vectors_taproot.json` to reflect the corrected test
vector generator. Changes include actual 32-byte MuSig2 partial
signatures (replacing the dummy 8-byte DER stubs), 66-byte public
nonces for both local and remote parties, corrected HTLC sig-to-
transaction mapping sorted by BIP 69 output index, proper HTLC-success
witness layout with preimage in the correct witness slot, and the
updated trimming test case which now trims 3 of the 5 test HTLCs below
the 2500 sat dust limit (down from 5 HTLC outputs to 2).

lnwallet: regenerate taproot test vectors with secret nonces

Regenerate the test vectors JSON to include local_sec_nonce and
remote_sec_nonce fields alongside the existing public nonces. The local
nonce fields now correctly correspond to local's verification nonce for
their own commitment transaction, matching the commitment tx stored in
the test vector.

lnwallet: emit actual MuSig2 partial sigs and nonces in test vectors

In this commit, we fix the taproot test vector generator to capture and
emit the real MuSig2 partial signatures and public nonces rather than
the dummy `CommitSig` value which is zeroed out for taproot channels.

Previously, the generator was reading from `CommitSig.ToSignatureBytes()`
which yielded a minimal DER encoding of `(0, 0)` (the 8-byte string
`3006020100020100`). For taproot channels the actual signature lives in
the `PartialSig` field of the `CommitSigs` struct, which carries both
the 32-byte partial sig scalar and the 66-byte compressed public nonce
needed by the verifier to reconstruct the combined signature.

We now unwrap the `PartialSig` from both the local and remote commitment
signatures, extract the nonce and sig bytes, and include `local_nonce`
and `remote_nonce` fields alongside `remote_partial_sig` in the emitted
JSON. This gives other implementations (eclair, CLN, etc.) all the
material they need to independently verify commitment transaction
signatures using their own MuSig2 libraries.

lnwallet: add taproot channel test vector generator

In this commit, we add a test vector generator and verifier for
taproot channel constructions. All vectors are derived
deterministically from a single 32-byte seed using SHA256(seed ||
label) for key derivation, ensuring any implementation can reproduce
them independently.

The generator covers two areas:

Script vectors decompose the full tapscript trees for every output
type: funding (MuSig2 aggregated key), to_local (delay + revocation
leaves), to_remote (1-block CSV leaf), anchors (OP_16 OP_CSV),
offered/accepted HTLCs on both local and remote commits, and
second-level HTLC transactions. Each entry captures the raw leaf
scripts, leaf hashes, tapscript root, internal key, output key, and
pkScript.

Transaction vectors produce full serialized commitment transactions
and HTLC resolution transactions for three scenarios: a simple
commitment with no HTLCs, a commitment with five untrimmed HTLCs,
and the same HTLCs at a higher fee rate causing some to be trimmed.

To generate: go test -run TestTaprootVectors ./lnwallet/ -args -generate-taproot-vectors
To verify: go test -run TestTaprootVectors ./lnwallet/

input: add production taproot HTLC succeed input constructor

This commit adds MakeTaprootHtlcSucceedInputFinal, a new input constructor
specifically for creating HTLC success inputs that use production taproot
witness types. This function parallels the existing MakeTaprootHtlcSucceedInput
but creates inputs with the TaprootHtlcAcceptedRemoteSuccessFinal witness type
instead of the staging variant.

The new constructor follows the same pattern and signature as its staging
counterpart, ensuring consistency in the input creation API. This allows
contract resolvers to create the appropriate input type based on whether
they are handling a staging or production taproot channel, ensuring that
the correct witness generation logic is applied during transaction creation.

This addition provides the necessary infrastructure for production taproot
channels to properly construct inputs for sweeping HTLC outputs on remote
commitment transactions with the optimized script structure.

actor: add CompleteWith and AwaitFuture generic package-level helpers

In this commit, we add two package-level generic helpers to the actor
module as part of the broader chan error -> Future[error] migration in
the discovery package.

CompleteWith[T](p Promise[T], val T) is a one-liner convenience wrapper
over p.Complete(fn.Ok(val)). It lets callers complete a promise with a
plain value without constructing an fn.Result inline, which cuts noise
at every completion site.

AwaitFuture[T](ctx, f Future[T]) (T, error) provides the symmetric
receive side: it blocks until the future resolves or the context is
cancelled and returns the value and any context error unpacked from
the fn.Result, matching the (val, err) convention callers expect.

Both functions are deliberately thin (no policy, no timeout, no new
state) so they compose freely with higher-level helpers built on top,
e.g. discovery.AwaitGossipResult.

go.mod is updated to pin the actor module via a local replace directive
so the rest of the lnd module picks up these additions without waiting
for a tagged release.

graph/db: add gossip version parameter to FilterKnownChanIDs

Add an explicit lnwire.GossipVersion parameter to FilterKnownChanIDs
on the Store interface, SQLStore, KVStore, and ChannelGraph. Since
FilterKnownChanIDs is always called from a version-scoped ChanSeries
context, a single version parameter is cleaner than per-item version
reads. A convenience wrapper on VersionedGraph preserves the existing
ChanSeries call-site signature by threading c.v automatically.

ci: use GITHUB_TOKEN instead of PAT for PR severity workflow

The PR severity classifier only needs to run `gh pr view`, `gh pr edit`
(labels), and `gh pr comment`. All three operations are fully covered by
the built-in GITHUB_TOKEN given the existing permissions block:

permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
issues: write

The workflow uses `pull_request_target`, which runs in the base repo
context, so GITHUB_TOKEN has write access even for fork PRs.

Inspection of the claude-code-action@v1 source confirmed that the only
internal call that would require `contents: write` is branch deletion,
which is never exercised here because Claude's tools are locked down to
`gh pr view/edit/comment` via --allowedTools.

This removes the dependency on the PR_SEVERITY_BOT_TOKEN PAT secret.

graph/db: convert TestLightningNodeSigVerification to versioned test

Rename to testLightningNodeSigVerification and add it to the
versionedTests table so it runs against both v1 and v2. The signing
step is version-specific (ECDSA for v1, Schnorr for v2) while the
verification path is shared.

lnwire: validate MuSig2 nonces in LocalNoncesData decode

Validate each nonce in decodeLocalNoncesData with
ValidateMusig2Nonce to reject malformed entries.

graph/db: add v2 block-height path for NodeUpdatesInHorizon

Add GetNodesByBlockHeightRange SQL query and wire it into
SQLStore.nodeUpdatesInHorizonV2. This mirrors the existing v1
time-based query but filters on (version, block_height) instead of
last_update, using the same [start, end) exclusive-end semantics
and (block_height, pub_key) compound cursor pagination.

The public-node filter for v2 checks for channels with a non-empty
channel announcement signature (c.signature), matching the v2
protocol's public channel indicator.