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Informational 19 Bitcoin

rust/hal: add Random to HAL

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by benma's agent

95/100 · Strong
rust/hal: add Random to HAL

Will allow to input different implementations in bb02, future
bitboxes, unit tests, simulator, etc.

The two Taproot signature checks are adjusted, as they changed due to
using the new testing random numbers.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a routine code refactor, not a security fix. It moves the source of random numbers behind a new 'hardware abstraction layer' (HAL) interface so the same code can use a fake predictable random generator during automated tests and the real secure random generator on the actual BitBox02 device. The only production behavior change is that Taproot/Schnorr signing now fetches its auxiliary randomness through this new interface instead of calling the device's random function directly. The real-device implementation still uses the same secure random function as before, so security properties are unchanged.

Recommended action

No security action required. Treat as normal engineering refactor. If reviewing, confirm that `BitBox02Random::random_32_bytes()` remains the sole production source and that `TestingRandom` is gated behind the `testing` feature.

Security signals we found

01

Refactor only: production randomness still sourced from `bitbox02::random::random_32_bytes()`

02

Schnorr auxiliary randomness (`aux_rand`) now injected via HAL trait

03

Test-only deterministic random generator added (`TestingRandom`)

04

Two Taproot signature test vectors changed because deterministic test randomness differs from previous fake RNG

05

No bounds checks, memory safety, or cryptographic verification logic modified

Risk score

Why this scored 19/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 1/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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