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Low 31 Bitcoin

eth: allow EIP-712 message signing without anti-klepto

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by benma's agent

78/100 · Adequate
eth: allow EIP-712 message signing without anti-klepto

Some defi apps require deterministic signatures, and anti-klepto is
not compatible with, as a random host nonce is contributed.

The host could instead contribute a constant nonce, which would work,
but the resulting signature would not be the same as a regular RFC6979
signature that does not use the additional data. This would not be
optimal in terms of interopability with other wallets.

This commit allows the host to skip the host nonce, in which case we
fall back to regular deterministic signatures.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds an optional mode for signing Ethereum typed messages (EIP-712) that skips the anti-klepto protocol, falling back to normal deterministic signatures. The change is intentional and documented: some DeFi apps need signatures that are reproducible by other wallets, which the anti-klepto protocol prevents. The feature is gated behind a new host flag and requires firmware v9.26.0 or newer. It does not remove anti-klepto from other signing paths such as Bitcoin or regular Ethereum transactions.

Recommended action

Review whether the opt-out is appropriately communicated to users and whether the device UI clearly distinguishes anti-klepto vs. non-anti-klepto EIP-712 signatures. Confirm that no other code paths accidentally pass `None` where anti-klepto is required. Consider adding a device-level confirmation prompt when anti-klepto is disabled.

Security signals we found

01

Feature adds a way to bypass anti-klepto for one signing path

02

Bypass is opt-in by the host and version-gated

03

Core signing primitive now supports both anti-klepto and deterministic modes

04

Other signing paths remain anti-klepto-only

05

No input validation, buffer overflow, or key-leakage changes observed

Risk score

Why this scored 31/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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