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Informational 12 Bitcoin

sign: Create MuSig2 signatures for known MuSig2 aggregate keys

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ava Chow

78/100 · Adequate
sign: Create MuSig2 signatures for known MuSig2 aggregate keys

When creating Taproot signatures, if the key being signed for is known
to be a MuSig2 aggregate key, do the MuSig2 signing algorithms.

First try to create the aggregate signature. This will fail if there are
not enough partial signatures or public nonces. If it does fail, try to
create a partial signature with all participant keys. This will fail for
those keys that we do not have the private keys for, and if there are
not enough public nonces. Lastly, if the partial signatures could not be
created, add our own public nonces for the private keys that we know, if
they do not yet exist.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds wallet-side support for producing MuSig2 aggregate and partial signatures when signing Taproot transactions. It is a feature implementation, not a fix for a known vulnerability. There is no evidence in the commit or supplied references that this change addresses a security bug, disclosure, or incident.

Recommended action

Review as normal feature code. No urgent security action is indicated by the commit itself. If MuSig2 is being deployed, ensure test coverage for aggregate/partial/nonce fallback paths and verify compatibility with BIP327/BIP341 tweak derivations.

Security signals we found

01

Adds new signing path for MuSig2 aggregate keys in Taproot key-path and script-path signing

02

Introduces GetAllMuSig2ParticipantPubkeys across SigningProvider, HidingSigningProvider, and FlatSigningProvider

03

Uses Assume() macros for defensive checks on tweak creation and partial signature non-nullity

04

No reference to CVE, security advisory, bug bounty, or incident in commit message or diff

Risk score

Why this scored 12/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 1/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 3/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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