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Low 31 Bitcoin

sign_psbt: use the signature type of inputs we are signing instead of a bool

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jon Griffiths

55/100 · Thin
sign_psbt: use the signature type of inputs we are signing instead of a bool

Also drive-by fix a log line.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how a Bitcoin hardware wallet (Blockstream Jade) tracks which transaction inputs it needs to sign. Previously it stored a simple yes/no flag; now it stores the actual signature type requested by the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction). The change is mostly a code-quality improvement, but it removes a place where the wrong signature type could silently be assumed. There is no direct evidence in the commit that an actual vulnerability was fixed, and no vendor security disclosure is present.

Recommended action

Treat as a hardening/correctness patch rather than an urgent security fix. Reviewers should verify that sig_type values returned by wally_psbt_get_input_signature_type are validated against supported signature types before use, and that downstream signing logic now consumes the explicit type where needed. No immediate user action is required unless the vendor later discloses this as a security fix.

Security signals we found

01

Change from boolean flag to explicit signature-type value reduces risk of defaulting to an incorrect signature type

02

No bounds check shown for the uint8_t cast from uint32_t sig_type, though values are expected to be small enum-like constants

03

No explicit validation that the returned signature type is one the firmware supports before storing it

04

Log-line correction is unrelated to security

Risk score

Why this scored 31/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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