AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Moderate 59 Bitcoin

WIF Store

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by scgbckbone

0/100 · Opaque
WIF Store
! Very short subject! Too few words to establish purpose! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new 'WIF Store' feature to the COLDCARD firmware. It lets users import external Bitcoin private keys (in WIF format) and use them to sign PSBT transactions and messages, alongside the device's normal seed-derived keys. The change is a deliberate new feature, not a hidden bug, but it touches sensitive code paths: private key storage, PSBT signing, address ownership checks, and message signing. There is no vendor statement in the commit or supplied references calling this a security fix or vulnerability.

Recommended action

Treat this as a feature-security review: verify that WIF private keys are encrypted at rest, that import/signing requires explicit user authorization, that WIF-store keys cannot be extracted by unauthorized USB/NFC/SD operations, and that the 'hobbled' read-only restrictions cannot be bypassed. Review tests for negative cases (wrong chain, invalid WIF, over-max imports) and ensure secure-clear on seed wipe or trick-pin wipe.

Security signals we found

01

New feature adds persistent storage of arbitrary private keys in device settings

02

PSBT signing path now branches on whether a required pubkey is in the WIF store

03

Address ownership verification now recognizes WIF-store addresses as 'ours'

04

Message signing can use imported WIF keys instead of seed-derived keys

05

WIF keys are displayed/exported in plaintext via QR, NFC, and microSD

06

Hobbled mode restricts WIF store to read-only, indicating vendor awareness of privilege concerns

07

No vendor statement in commit describes this as a security fix or vulnerability

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.