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Low 35 Bitcoin

Use 73 bytes der-encoded signatures in weight estimation (#3210)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Bastien Teinturier

100/100 · Strong
Use 73 bytes der-encoded signatures in weight estimation (#3210)

While 73 bytes der-encoded signatures aren't standard (they're only
possible with high-S signatures), miners could accept such signatures.

Most of our tests use 72 bytes der-encoded signatures because we will
never generate 73 bytes der-encoded signatures ourselves. But it's more
safe to use a 73 bytes signature in our weight estimation because:

- it's what the BOLTs recommend
- it's what other implementations use (e.g. LDK) which means they may
reject our interactive-tx attempts by thinking we're under-paying
fees
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adjusts how Eclair estimates the 'weight' (a measure of transaction size used to calculate Bitcoin mining fees) for funding inputs in Lightning channel transactions. It increases the assumed signature size from 72 to 73 bytes, matching what the Lightning specification recommends and what other implementations like LDK use. The change is defensive: it helps prevent Eclair's interactive transaction proposals from being rejected by peers who think Eclair is under-paying fees, and it avoids edge cases where miners might accept a slightly larger signature than Eclair accounted for.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine correctness/defensive patch. Update nodes to include the revised weight estimation to avoid interactive-tx failures with LDK and other BOLT-compliant peers. No emergency response is warranted; there is no evidence of an exploitable vulnerability in signature handling itself.

Security signals we found

01

Fee-estimation mismatch between implementations could cause interactive-tx negotiation failures

02

Under-estimated weight could lead to insufficient fees if a 73-byte high-S signature is accepted by miners

03

Change aligns with BOLT 3 recommendation and LDK behavior

04

No signature validation or cryptography change; only weight accounting

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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