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Moderate 64 Bitcoin

fix: remove insecure PRNG fallback

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by ww3512687

80/100 · Strong
fix: remove insecure PRNG fallback

Remove trezor-crypto's unused LCG and weak fallback so device builds must link the platform random_buffer implementation. Keep a simulator-only standard library stub.

Co-authored-by: Nikolaus Heger <nheger@gmail.com>
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit removes a weak, predictable random-number generator that was bundled as a backup inside the firmware's SLIP-39 code. Previously, if the device's proper hardware random source was accidentally left out of a build, the firmware could silently fall back to the weak generator, which would make wallet backup seeds predictable. Now the weak generator is gone for hardware builds, so a missing proper random source causes the build to fail instead of silently producing insecure seeds. The simulator still keeps a simple software-only stub for testing.

Recommended action

Verify that production hardware builds still link successfully and that arm-none-eabi-nm shows only the strong platform random_buffer symbol with no residual random32/random_uniform/random_permute/random_reseed symbols. Confirm the simulator build still functions for testing. Consider adding CI checks that fail if the weak fallback symbols reappear.

Security signals we found

01

Removal of deterministic LCG PRNG (random32)

02

Removal of weak-symbol random_buffer fallback

03

Removal of unused random helper APIs

04

Hardware builds now require platform random_buffer implementation

05

Simulator-only non-cryptographic stub retained

06

Issue #2255 referenced as security hardening fix

Risk score

Why this scored 64/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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