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Informational 12 Bitcoin

lnwallet/chancloser: move nonce rotation to LocalOfferSent

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Olaoluwa Osuntokun

88/100 · Strong
lnwallet/chancloser: move nonce rotation to LocalOfferSent

Move the RemoteCloseeNonce update from updateAndValidateCloseTerms to
LocalOfferSent.ProcessEvent. This keeps updateAndValidateCloseTerms
focused on close term validation, and makes the nonce rotation point
explicit in the state machine — it happens when processing the
LocalSigReceived event, alongside signature extraction.

Update TestNextCloseeNonceStorageFromClosingSig to verify that
updateAndValidateCloseTerms no longer modifies RemoteCloseeNonce.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This is a small internal code cleanup in LND's cooperative channel-closing logic. It moves where a cryptographic nonce is updated from one function to another within the same state machine, with no indication of a security bug or user-facing behavior change. The change is framed by the author as improving code organization, not fixing a vulnerability.

Recommended action

No security action required. Treat as normal code-quality refactor. If reviewing for a release, verify that the moved nonce rotation is still invoked for all intended taproot cooperative-close paths and that no duplicate or missed rotation occurs.

Security signals we found

01

No security-relevant keywords in commit title or message

02

Refactor only: existing nonce extraction logic moved to a different state-machine event handler

03

Test updated to assert absence of side effect in previous function

04

No validation rules weakened or bypassed in the diff

05

No vendor disclosure of security relevance

Risk score

Why this scored 12/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 0/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 0/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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