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Informational 19 Bitcoin

Introduce ecdsa signing function for PrivateKey

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Mitchell Bagot

85/100 · Strong
Introduce ecdsa signing function for PrivateKey

In psbt, ecdsa signing is required to generate the partial signatures
from the bip32 derivation paths. At present, this requires the user to
call through to secp256k1 to use the ecdsa::sign function with the
inner secp key type. Since we want to avoid the as_inner accessors
entirely, a method for ecdsa signing with a wrapped PrivateKey is
necessary.

Introduce raw_ecdsa_sign function on PrivateKey to sign a message and
return a secp256k1::ecdsa::Signature.
Adjust sign-tx-segwit-v0 example to use signing function on PrivateKey.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a convenience method so that a Bitcoin private key object can directly create an ECDSA signature, instead of forcing callers to reach into the underlying secp256k1 library. It also updates internal code and an example to use the new method. There is no obvious security bug in the change itself, but it slightly changes how nonces are generated for signatures: the new helper uses a 'low-R' nonce-grinding scheme, whereas the previous PSBT code used the default signing path. That is generally a compatibility improvement, not a vulnerability, but it is a behavior change worth noting.

Recommended action

No immediate action required. Reviewers should confirm that the switch to low-R signing in PSBT is intentional and compatible with downstream consumers, and that the new raw_ecdsa_sign name clearly signals it returns a raw secp256k1 signature rather than a bitcoin::ecdsa::Signature. Consider whether the method should be named or documented more explicitly to avoid misuse.

Security signals we found

01

New signing helper changes nonce generation path from default ECDSA signing to low-R nonce grinding

02

PSBT partial-signature creation now uses low-R signing instead of the previous default signing

03

No new bounds checks, no new secret-exposure paths, no new dependencies

04

API-only refactor with behavior change limited to signature encoding size/compatibility

Risk score

Why this scored 19/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 1/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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