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Low 34 Bitcoin

Cleanup: Remove redundant (hmac, nonce) from codebase

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by shaavan

78/100 · Adequate
Cleanup: Remove redundant (hmac, nonce) from codebase

Now that we have introduced an alternate mechanism for authentication
in the codebase, we can safely remove the now redundant (hmac, nonce)
fields from the Payment ReceiveTlvs's while maintaining the security
of the onion messages.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit removes an older, now-redundant HMAC/nonce authentication mechanism from LDK's blinded payment paths. The code had already introduced a newer 'ReceiveAuthKey' way to authenticate the same data, so the old (hmac, nonce) fields are being stripped out to simplify the codebase. The change is described by the project as a cleanup, not a security fix, and the diff shows the old verification checks being replaced by reliance on the newer mechanism. There is no direct evidence in the commit of an exploitable vulnerability, but removing a redundant authentication layer is a normal hardening step.

Recommended action

Treat this as a code-cleanup refactor rather than an urgent vulnerability patch. Reviewers should confirm that ReceiveAuthKey-based authentication is actually enforced on all inbound BlindedPaymentPath/Trampoline receive contexts that previously relied on the removed HMAC, and that no code path still expects or silently ignores the old authentication TLV. Regression tests for authentication failure (e.g., fails_receive_tlvs_authentication) should continue to pass with the new mechanism.

Security signals we found

01

Removal of redundant HMAC/nonce authentication fields

02

Replacement of legacy authenticate()/verify_for_offer_payment() with ReceiveAuthKey-based authentication

03

Deletion of PAYMENT_TLVS_HMAC_INPUT and associated HMAC helpers

04

Serialization change dropping TLV 65539 (authentication) from receive TLVs

05

Comment indicating old receive contexts will fail new authentication checks

Risk score

Why this scored 34/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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