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Informational 17 Bitcoin

feat(clear_signing): externalise provider names

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by PrisionMike

57/100 · Thin
feat(clear_signing): externalise provider names

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new optional 'provider_name' field to the data structure used for Ethereum 'clear signing' on Trezor devices. When a provider name is supplied, the device will show that name instead of the usual recipient address lookup during transaction confirmation. The change itself is a feature addition, but it creates a new channel where a connected computer could tell the Trezor screen to display an arbitrary label for the recipient. There is no evidence in the commit that the input is validated, length-limited, or checked against the actual blockchain address, which could allow a malicious or compromised host application to mislabel a transaction recipient.

Recommended action

Treat this as a UI-spoofing risk requiring follow-up review. Verify whether provider_name is validated (length, charset, matching address or registry entry) before display, whether the device still shows the underlying address somewhere on the confirmation screen, and whether the host-side code that populates provider_name is trustworthy. If no validation exists, add allowlist/registry checks or at least co-display the real address to prevent recipient spoofing.

Security signals we found

01

New untrusted string field (provider_name) rendered in transaction UI

02

Provider name replaces address-book lookup, potentially hiding true recipient

03

No visible input validation, length limits, or allowlist in the diff

04

Clear-signing UI is a security-critical user confirmation surface

05

Commit is marked [no changelog] and contains no security discussion

Risk score

Why this scored 17/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 3/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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