AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Low 36 Bitcoin

feat(core): support EIP-7702 authorization/revocation

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Roman Zeyde

98/100 · Strong
feat(core): support EIP-7702 authorization/revocation

Figma: https://www.figma.com/design/3wF1eh3Ftj0XGX7wFmev8t/EIP-7702?node-id=6358-2421&t=vo7F599zB7Cp9K5D-0

Changelog entry has been updated in a previous commit.

[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds support for signing Ethereum EIP-7702 authorizations and revocations on Trezor hardware wallets. EIP-7702 lets an Ethereum account temporarily delegate control to a smart contract. The code adds a new signing workflow, user confirmation screens, and command-line support. It is a feature addition, not a fix for a known vulnerability. The main security consideration is that authorizing delegation is a powerful operation, so the code requires users to disable strict safety checks and confirm on the device, while revocation remains allowed under strict checks.

Recommended action

Review the EIP-7702 signature construction against the final EIP-7702 specification to ensure the magic byte 0x05 and RLP encoding match the standard. Verify that the delegate allowlist and strict-safety-check gating provide the intended risk mitigation. Confirm that the new message type is properly gated by experimental-features and that UI strings clearly warn users about account delegation. No immediate patch is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

New cryptographic signing path for EIP-7702 authorization tuples

02

Hard-coded delegate allowlist restricts authorization to known contracts

03

Strict safety checks block authorization but allow revocation

04

Nonce upper bound check (>= 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF rejected)

05

User must confirm delegation/revocation on-device before signing

06

No changelog entry in this commit; prior commit updated changelog

Risk score

Why this scored 36/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 6/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.