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Low 29 Bitcoin

feat(common,core,python,tests): migrate Soroban authorization to SOROBAN_CREDENTIALS_ADDRESS_V2.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jun Luo

77/100 · Adequate
feat(common,core,python,tests): migrate Soroban authorization to SOROBAN_CREDENTIALS_ADDRESS_V2.

[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit updates Trezor's Stellar/Soroban smart-contract support to match a newer Stellar protocol version (Protocol 27). It renames the credential type from the older SOROBAN_CREDENTIALS_ADDRESS to SOROBAN_CREDENTIALS_ADDRESS_V2 and updates the related field name from address to address_v2 across the firmware, Python library, Rust client, and tests. The older credential type is intentionally no longer supported. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability being fixed; it reads as a routine protocol compatibility update.

Recommended action

Treat as a normal feature/protocol-compatibility update. Reviewers should verify that the legacy SOROBAN_CREDENTIALS_ADDRESS type is correctly rejected by both firmware and host library, and that test vectors cover the new ADDRESS_V2 serialization and confirmation path. No immediate security response is indicated by the commit content alone.

Security signals we found

01

Protocol version bump for Stellar Soroban authorization (v27)

02

Legacy SOROBAN_CREDENTIALS_ADDRESS (value 1) marked reserved and unsupported

03

Field rename address -> address_v2 across protobuf, core, python, rust

04

Dependency bump stellar-sdk >=15 for Protocol 27 XDR support

05

UI confirmation path updated to display ADDRESS_V2 credentials

Risk score

Why this scored 29/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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