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Low 32 Bitcoin

chore(core): remove double check when changing pin

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Martin Pastyřík

62/100 · Adequate
chore(core): remove double check when changing pin

[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit refactors how the Trezor hardware wallet changes its PIN. Previously, the storage layer itself re-checked the old PIN while changing it. Now the device must already be unlocked before changing the PIN, and the change-PIN function only sets the new PIN. The change is described as removing a redundant 'double check.' It also adds more detailed error codes so the firmware can tell the user exactly what went wrong. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes an active security bug, but it is a meaningful change to a security-critical function.

Recommended action

Treat as a security-hardening refactor rather than a confirmed vulnerability fix. Review that every caller now correctly verifies the old PIN before invoking change_pin, that the new error codes cannot leak sensitive state, and that the legacy removal path's added unlock check does not introduce a UI or denial-of-service regression. Run the updated PIN/random/upgrade test suites and consider a targeted audit of the syscall/smcall argument reduction for change_pin.

Security signals we found

01

Removal of internal PIN verification from storage_change_pin

02

Addition of fine-grained unlock and PIN-change result enums

03

Caller-side enforcement that storage must be unlocked before PIN change

04

Legacy firmware now explicitly unlocks before PIN removal

05

Change affects trusted-zone syscall/smcall verifiers and Rust bindings

Risk score

Why this scored 32/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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