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Low 30 Bitcoin

build: prevent uv from using packages newer than 30 days

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by matejcik

98/100 · Strong
build: prevent uv from using packages newer than 30 days

- Limits exposure of the repo to supply chain compromise -- as long as you use uv.
- Downgraded Mako (path traversal vulnerability is irrelevant for us).
- If a relevant security is available, we'll have to whitelist that package -- use `exclude-newer-package` (https://docs.astral.sh/uv/reference/settings/#exclude-newer-package).
- Switched buildsystem declaration from hatchling to flit everywhere.

[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a hardening change to Trezor's build tooling. It tells the Python package manager 'uv' not to use any package uploaded to PyPI in the last 30 days, which reduces the risk of accidentally pulling in a freshly compromised dependency. It also downgrades the 'Mako' template library from 1.3.12 to 1.3.10 and switches the build system from 'hatchling' to 'flit' in several sub-projects. The commit message explicitly says the goal is to limit supply-chain compromise exposure.

Recommended action

No immediate action is required; this is a defensive build-hardening commit. Users and downstream builders should ensure they use `uv` so the `exclude-newer` policy is enforced, and monitor the whitelist (`exclude-newer-package`) if a security-relevant update needs to be adopted within the 30-day window.

Security signals we found

01

Supply-chain hardening via uv exclude-newer policy

02

Dependency downgrade (Mako 1.3.12 -> 1.3.10)

03

Build backend migration (hatchling -> flit_core)

04

Commit message explicitly frames change as limiting supply chain compromise exposure

Risk score

Why this scored 30/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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