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Informational 19 Bitcoin

feat(clear_signing): identify a tokenAmount token by a constant address

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by PrisionMike

85/100 · Strong
feat(clear_signing): identify a tokenAmount token by a constant address

Adds an additive proto field (EthereumERC7730FieldInfo.const_token_address) and lets TokenAmountFormatter resolve its token from that literal address instead of a token_path - for descriptors whose token is a `$.metadata.constants.*` reference rather than a calldata parameter.

[no changelog]

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new optional field to Trezor's Ethereum clear-signing protocol that lets a token amount be tied to a fixed contract address rather than pulled from transaction data. It is a feature addition, not a bug fix, and there is no evidence in the commit that it addresses a security flaw. The change does not appear to introduce an obvious vulnerability, but it slightly expands the attack surface by adding another way token addresses are resolved.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine feature commit. If auditing, verify that `const_token_address` values are validated (e.g., 20-byte Ethereum address length and checksum where applicable) before being used in token metadata lookups, and ensure the new field cannot be combined with `token_path` in a way that causes confusion or address spoofing in UI display.

Security signals we found

01

New optional protobuf field for token address resolution

02

Token address now accepted as literal constant without visible length/format validation

03

No changelog entry provided

04

No vendor security disclosure or CVE references present

Risk score

Why this scored 19/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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