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Low 45 Bitcoin

feat(core): functions for Evolu spam protection

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Martin Pastyřík

57/100 · Thin
feat(core): functions for Evolu spam protection

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds new Trezor firmware features for an 'Evolu' / 'Suite Sync' service. It introduces a device-bound delegated identity key, a way to export that key after user confirmation, and ways to prove possession of that key to request a SLIP-21 node or to sign a registration request with the device's Optiga certificate. The change is framed by the vendor as spam protection / anti-abuse functionality, not as a security fix. The commit itself is a feature implementation, but it touches sensitive areas: key derivation from a new per-device master secret, secure-monitor/kernel syscalls for reading a private key, and user-consent flows for exporting a private key.

Recommended action

Treat this as a high-sensitivity feature change requiring focused review, not as an urgent vulnerability patch. Reviewers should verify: (1) the new master key is generated with sufficient entropy and locked in OTP before any use, (2) the HMAC-based derivation is domain-separated correctly and cannot collide with other key indices, (3) the syscall/smcall verifier prevents arbitrary kernel/secure-world memory writes, (4) the proof-of-possession signature scheme is robust against replay and malleability, (5) the user confirmation for EvoluGetDelegatedIdentityKey cannot be bypassed, and (6) the raw private key is zeroized after use in all paths. No immediate user action is indicated by the commit itself.

Security signals we found

01

New private-key export message added (EvoluGetDelegatedIdentityKey returns raw nist256p1 private key)

02

New syscall/smcall added to read delegated identity key from secure world into caller buffer

03

New per-device master key generated in flash OTP and used for deterministic key derivation

04

Proof-of-possession signature required before SLIP-21 node export and before Optiga-signed registration

05

User confirmation dialog added for delegated identity key export ('Suite Sync')

06

THP credential validation added on THP-enabled devices before key export

07

Certificate chain parser moved from authenticate_device to apps.common.certificates (shared code)

08

Legacy firmware skips all Evolu messages

Risk score

Why this scored 45/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 10/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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