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Low 49 Bitcoin

fix(solana): show threshold on multisig init

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jakub Janků

85/100 · Strong
fix(solana): show threshold on multisig init

The current flow makes it appear as if the signature scheme is an
N-out-of-N multisig (i.e., all signers are required), when in fact
the scheme is an M-out-of-N threshold scheme. This can give the user
a false sense of security, in particular when M=1 and anyone from
the list of signers can approve token-related operations. This commit
displays the value M to the user.

[no changelog]

(cherry picked from commit 1e5c4edbd7e9073f271f0cdf1bf744cbe0f82c9b)
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a misleading display on Trezor hardware wallets when a user initializes a Solana multisig account. Previously, the device only showed the list of possible signers without showing how many signatures were actually required to approve transactions. This made a 1-out-of-N multisig look like an N-out-of-N multisig, which could trick a user into thinking funds or token operations were safer than they really were. The patch now displays the threshold number (M) so the user sees, for example, '1 of 3 signers required' rather than just '3 signers'.

Recommended action

Users should update to firmware containing this commit and re-verify any Solana multisig accounts they created or interacted with while running older firmware, especially checking the actual threshold value on-chain. Developers should audit other instruction UIs for similarly hidden threshold or permission parameters.

Security signals we found

01

UI misrepresentation of authorization threshold

02

Missing display of critical multisig parameter

03

Potential false sense of security for low-threshold multisigs

04

User-deception / social-engineering risk rather than memory-safety or cryptographic bug

Risk score

Why this scored 49/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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