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Informational 18 Bitcoin

refactor(core/rust): use ZeroizeOnDrop

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Martin Milata

57/100 · Thin
refactor(core/rust): use ZeroizeOnDrop

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a code cleanup in the Trezor firmware's Rust cryptography code. It replaces hand-written memory-clearing code with a standard library feature called ZeroizeOnDrop. The goal is the same: erase sensitive cryptographic data from memory when objects are destroyed. There is no evidence this commit fixes an active security bug; it is a defensive hardening and refactoring change.

Recommended action

No immediate action required. Treat as routine defensive refactoring. Review that ZeroizeOnDrop is correctly derived for all fields containing sensitive data and that the zeroize_derive feature does not introduce unwanted dependencies or code size increases in the embedded firmware build.

Security signals we found

01

Use of zeroize/ZeroizeOnDrop for sensitive cryptographic material

02

Removal of manual Drop implementations that zeroized buffers

03

No functional change to cryptographic operations or memory safety semantics

04

Defensive hardening against potential memory disclosure of key material

Risk score

Why this scored 18/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 1/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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