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Passport firmware

Firmware for Foundation Passport Bitcoin signing devices.

BitcoinHardware walletsNormal
Repository coverage

78 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

21security candidates23second-pass queue10AI analyses
3commits · 30 days
7commits · 60 days
66commits · 180 days
78commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 612 seen0 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 659 seen3 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 64 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 52 seen0 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

54/100 average clarity
2Strong · 80–100
28Adequate · 60–79
43Thin · 40–59
5Opaque · 0–39
2security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Matt Gleason53137051
Jack741063
Jean-Pierre De Jesus DIAZ821061
Ken Carpenter311048
Jacksper13110058
dependabot[bot]500076
mjg-foundation100045
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 0 minutes ago

Low 47 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-6378: removed more branching from mnemonic decode process

This commit tweaks the code that converts a user's BIP39 recovery phrase (mnemonic words) into secret bits inside a hardware wallet. The change removes an 'if' branch during word copying so the loop always writes to the same positions, reg…

Branchless, constant-time-style copy of sensitive input wordsMasking of post-delimiter bytes to zero to avoid information leakage via memory access patternsRemoval of conditional stores that depended on word length
d0edb18aby Matt Gleason+13−71 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-6378: refined more comments

This commit only rewrites two code comments in a BIP39 mnemonic parser to be shorter and clearer. It does not change any executable code, logic, or behavior. There is no security-relevant change.

e58baa89by Matt Gleason+2−31 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 35 · Opaque
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-6378: improved comments

This commit only rewrites comments in a source file that handles BIP39 seed phrases. No code logic, buffer sizes, or function behavior were changed. It is a documentation-only cleanup and does not affect security.

42cad0d8by Matt Gleason+9−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 63 AI analysisMessage 60 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-6378: responded to more feedback, needs testing and evaluation

This commit hardens the code that converts a user's BIP39 recovery phrase (seed words) into secret bits. It fixes a bug where 8-character words were wrongly rejected, makes the loop length independent of the number of words to reduce timin…

Timing-side-channel mitigation: outer loop iteration count made independent of mnemonic word countOut-of-bounds read prevention: inner loop index bounded against sizeof(padded)-1Off-by-one fix: inner loop bound changed from BIP39_MAX_WORD_LEN-1 to BIP39_MAX_WORD_LEN
42f95ed8by Matt Gleason+25−181 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-6378: made more parts of mnemonic parsing and fetching constant time

This commit hardens the code that converts a user's BIP-39 seed phrase into secret data. It removes timing and loop-behavior clues that an attacker with physical access might measure to learn how many words the phrase has, how long each wo…

Constant-time / secret-independent control-flow hardeningRemoval of input-length-dependent loops in mnemonic parsingRemoval of early returns on invalid word length
5a0cc5edby Matt Gleason+52−183 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 49 AI analysisMessage 75 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-6378: first pass at anti-sidechannel round 2, needs testing and evaluation

This commit is a defensive hardening change for the BIP-39 seed-word handling code in the Passport hardware wallet firmware. It restructures how the English word list is stored so that a constant-time word comparison function can safely re…

Constant-time/side-channel hardeningFixed-width wordlist storage to avoid out-of-bounds reads in constant-time comparisonRemoval of unreliable wall-clock timing assertions from CI tests
2c7dc29fby Matt Gleason+22−224 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

Pass expected_address through QR message signing path

This commit fixes a consistency issue in the QR-code message-signing flow of the Passport hardware wallet. Previously, when signing a message via QR code, the wallet did not pass the user-confirmed address down to the signing code as an ex…

Adds expected_address validation to a previously unvalidated code pathMirrors an existing security control from another input path (microSD / PR #636)Separates canonical/raw address used for verification from human-readable stylized address used for display
80fda3a1by Jack+3−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-6378: Fix mnemonic_to_bits() and ct_word_eq() to be constant time.

This commit fixes a timing side-channel weakness in the code that converts a BIP-39 recovery phrase (a list of words) back into the secret digital bits. Before the fix, the code stopped searching the word list as soon as it found a match a…

Timing side-channel mitigation in mnemonic decodingConstant-time string comparison added (`ct_word_eq`)Unconditional full wordlist scan to avoid index-dependent timing
f8311ca7by Ken Carpenter+238−183 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-3834: added microsd message signing

This commit adds a new menu option that lets users sign a message using a file stored on a microSD card, alongside the existing option to sign by scanning a QR code. It reuses the same internal signing logic that was already used for healt…

No new cryptographic operations introduced; existing sign_text_file_task is reusedNo changes to input validation length checks or address-type handlingFile filter now excludes files containing '-signed' to avoid re-signing output files
e47977e3by Matt Gleason+37−114 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
FD FoundationPassport firmware BitcoinHardware wallets

SFT-4389: Update copyright e-mail address.

This commit is a bulk update of the company's contact email address in copyright headers and documentation. It replaces 'hello@foundationdevices.com' with 'hello@foundation.xyz' across 728 files. There are no code logic changes, no securit…

8c1f220bby Jean-Pierre De Jesus DIAZ+735−735728 files
No security note in commit
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Security candidateSFT-6378: removed more branching from mnemonic decode processby Matt Gleason · d0edb18a · Jun 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinLow 47Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: removed more branching from mnemonic decode process

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Low 47/100

This commit tweaks the code that converts a user's BIP39 recovery phrase (mnemonic words) into secret bits inside a hardware wallet. The change removes an 'if' branch during word copying so the loop always writes to the same positions, regardless of how long each word is. The stated goal is to make the copy operation take the same amount of time and perform the same memory accesses for every word length, which can help defend against timing and power-analysis side-channel attacks that might otherwise leak information about the recovery phrase.

Security candidateSFT-6378: refined more commentsby Matt Gleason · e58baa89 · May 29, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: refined more comments

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only rewrites two code comments in a BIP39 mnemonic parser to be shorter and clearer. It does not change any executable code, logic, or behavior. There is no security-relevant change.

Security candidateSFT-6378: improved commentsby Matt Gleason · 42cad0d8 · May 28, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: improved comments

35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only rewrites comments in a source file that handles BIP39 seed phrases. No code logic, buffer sizes, or function behavior were changed. It is a documentation-only cleanup and does not affect security.

Security candidateSFT-6378: responded to more feedback, needs testing and evaluationby Matt Gleason · 42f95ed8 · May 25, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateModerate 63Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: responded to more feedback, needs testing and evaluation

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100

This commit hardens the code that converts a user's BIP39 recovery phrase (seed words) into secret bits. It fixes a bug where 8-character words were wrongly rejected, makes the loop length independent of the number of words to reduce timing clues, adds bounds checks to prevent reading past the end of the input buffer, and clears sensitive buffers before returning on error. The changes are defensive and reduce side-channel and out-of-bounds risks, but the commit message frames them as feedback responses needing testing, so it is not a finished security fix.

Security candidateSFT-6378: made more parts of mnemonic parsing and fetching constant timeby Matt Gleason · 5a0cc5ed · May 24, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 50 · ThinModerate 59Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: made more parts of mnemonic parsing and fetching constant time

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
constant-time or timing behaviorcryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit hardens the code that converts a user's BIP-39 seed phrase into secret data. It removes timing and loop-behavior clues that an attacker with physical access might measure to learn how many words the phrase has, how long each word is, or where word boundaries fall. The change is defensive: it makes the parsing routine run in constant time and on a fixed-size buffer, reducing side-channel leakage. There is no claim in the commit that an actual exploit exists.

Security candidateSFT-6378: first pass at anti-sidechannel round 2, needs testing and evaluationby Matt Gleason · 2c7dc29f · May 19, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 75 · AdequateLow 49Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-6378: first pass at anti-sidechannel round 2, needs testing and
evaluation

75/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Low 49/100

This commit is a defensive hardening change for the BIP-39 seed-word handling code in the Passport hardware wallet firmware. It restructures how the English word list is stored so that a constant-time word comparison function can safely read every entry without accidentally touching memory past the end of a short word. It also removes noisy timing-test thresholds that could fail on shared CI machines and keeps only a stricter statistical correlation check. The change is explicitly described by the developer as an early 'first pass' that still needs testing and evaluation, so it is not a finished security fix.

Security candidatePass expected_address through QR message signing pathby Jack · 80fda3a1 · May 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · Jack

Pass expected_address through QR message signing path

Mirrors the WYSIWYG-signing assertion that microSD signing already has
(added in #636). Keeps self.address raw (used as expected_address) and
uses a local display_address for stylization in the preview.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit fixes a consistency issue in the QR-code message-signing flow of the Passport hardware wallet. Previously, when signing a message via QR code, the wallet did not pass the user-confirmed address down to the signing code as an explicit 'expected address' check. The microSD signing path already had this safety check. After the change, the raw, verified address is passed through and used to confirm the signature is for the correct address, while a stylized version is still shown on screen. This reduces the risk that a tricked or confused user signs a message with the wrong address.

Security candidateSFT-6378: Fix mnemonic_to_bits() and ct_word_eq() to be constant time.by Ken Carpenter · f8311ca7 · Feb 26, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 50 · ThinModerate 60Details
Commit message · Ken Carpenter

SFT-6378: Fix mnemonic_to_bits() and ct_word_eq() to be constant time.

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
constant-time or timing behaviorcryptography-sensitive pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a timing side-channel weakness in the code that converts a BIP-39 recovery phrase (a list of words) back into the secret digital bits. Before the fix, the code stopped searching the word list as soon as it found a match and used a normal string comparison, so an attacker measuring tiny time differences might learn which words were entered. The new version always scans the entire word list and compares words in constant time, making the process take the same amount of time regardless of the phrase. A new test checks that timing does not vary with the word positions.

Security candidateSFT-3834: added microsd message signingby Matt Gleason · e47977e3 · Feb 23, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 45 · ThinInformational 12Details
Commit message · Matt Gleason

SFT-3834: added microsd message signing

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit adds a new menu option that lets users sign a message using a file stored on a microSD card, alongside the existing option to sign by scanning a QR code. It reuses the same internal signing logic that was already used for health checks, just with different on-screen labels and file filters. There is no indication in the code that this weakens security or introduces a vulnerability; it appears to be a normal feature addition.

Security candidateSFT-4389: Update copyright e-mail address.by Jean-Pierre De Jesus DIAZ · 8c1f220b · Feb 23, 2026 · 728 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Jean-Pierre De Jesus DIAZ

SFT-4389: Update copyright e-mail address.

Changes made using:

```
rg 'hello@foundationdevices\.com' --files-with-matches | xargs sed -i 's/hello@foundationdevices\.com/hello@foundation.xyz/g'
```

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathseed or entropy pathsigning or wallet pathboot or update pathauthentication pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a bulk update of the company's contact email address in copyright headers and documentation. It replaces 'hello@foundationdevices.com' with 'hello@foundation.xyz' across 728 files. There are no code logic changes, no security fixes, and no functional changes to the firmware.