AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Moderate 59 Bitcoin

Trustworthy sign_psbt amount/fee display for non-default sighash: implementation

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ilya Artemov

50/100 · Thin
Trustworthy sign_psbt amount/fee display for non-default sighash: implementation
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Ledger Bitcoin app shows transaction amounts and fees on the device screen when a user signs a transaction that does not use the normal 'sign everything' rule (a so-called non-default sighash). Previously the app might have displayed a fee or total that could actually change later, because some sighash types let other people add inputs or change outputs after the signature. Now the app detects those cases and either shows only the net amount the user is spending/receiving, or shows a warning that amounts cannot be verified. It also adds a 'Signing rule' line so the user knows the transaction is not fully committed.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-hardening change and include it in release notes. Review the new display flows on both Nano and Stax/Flex form factors to ensure users cannot be confused into approving transactions with untrustworthy amounts. Verify that the UNAVAILABLE path cannot be bypassed and that NET_ONLY correctly omits fee information for open-output sighashes.

Security signals we found

01

UI trust reduction for non-default sighash prevents misleading fee/amount display

02

Sighash classification helpers centralize ANYONECANPAY/NONE/SINGLE semantics

03

Mixed-sighash detection disables coherent amount display

04

Negative-fee rejection scoped to fully-committed transactions only

05

Default wallet label now derived from captured BIP-44 purpose/account

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.